A conversion story
Sunday, December 10th, 2006Since I can recall having any opinion on the subject, I have considered myself a mathematical formalist: "Doing math" means formal symbol manipulation, and its relevance lies solely in the utility or beauty of the maths. Formalism can be contrasted with platonism, since a platonist believes that a statement, like the axiom of choice, undecideable in a given system may still have an objective truth value, and it is reasonable to discuss whether such a statement is true or false, even though it cannot be proved either way. A formalist laughs at such assertions, and simply explores all the possibilities available: and in this case an axiomatic system which rejects the axiom of choice may be just as interesting as one which accepts.
I considered myself a formalist until Thursday. On that day, the BBC online published an article entitled 1200-year-old problem 'easy' which celebrated a crank's solution to the problem of dividing by zero. Reading his papers, it was obvious that he was mostly assigning the symbol $Phi$ to mean "undefined", and any operation which is not closed under the reals goes to $Phi$. To a formalist, thiskind of thing is fine, if useless. We can create whatever symbols we want, and assign whatever meanings we want, and then see what happens. Granted, it is frustrating that someone could be regarded as a "genius" by doing this, even if only by a journalist for an online newspaper.
Actually, outrage is an appropriate response to him hoodwinking a local school to teach children this kind of nonsense.
I was disturbed, though, by a thought that gripped me as I read his papers, though: $1/0=infty$? $-1/0=-infty$? Wait, he defines $0^0=Phi$ instead of 1? It's not only useless, it's wrong.
I had to sit back and recollect myself. How could it be wrong? How can any consistent mathematical statment really be wrong? Surely, I'm not having such platonist thoughts, am I?
Then I remembered an experience I had reading through Sierpinski's Cardinal and Ordinal Numbers earlier in the week. Why is he spending so much time on philosophy of the Axiom of Choice when it is obviously true? It can't be "obviously true" to a formalist, since it is well known that its negation is consistent with the relevant axioms in set theory.
And the, the most damning evidence. I had written up a brief note on a particular product on posets, which seemed more useful than the one given in Harzheim's Ordered Sets. One point being that it could be seen as a generalization of both cardinal and ordinal exponentiation, and so by introducing a bit of notation to distinguish finite cardinals (as antichains) and finite ordinals (as chains) we can remove some of the ambiguity of the exponentiation notation. The paper's working title? The correct poset product.
I'd like to use some of my newfound freedom in making pronouncements about concepts I know I can't prove, but I don't know where to start. I will begin by re-affirming that the axiom of choice is obviously true, and $0^0$ is obviously 1. I wish I could weigh in on the continuum hypothesis, but I find I can't. It seems clear that we cannot take it as an axiom, but I simply don't know yet whether it is true or false; although I rather suspect it to be false.
And so I must be off to find some more mathematical statements to believe in the absence of proof. (I know this is ridiculous, but not nearly so ridiculous as the lengths some constructivists will go to.)
Currently listening:
Specular Highlights
By Plint
Release date: 3 January 1992











